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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relationship between a particular 
epistemological perspective and foresight methodology. We draw on a body of social 
theory concerned with the way that meaning is produced and assimilated by society; 
specifically, the social construction of knowledge, which is distinguished from its 
near-neighbour constructivism by its focus on inter-subjectivity.  We show that social 
constructionism, at least in its weak form, seems to be implicit in many 
epistemological assumptions underlying futures studies.  We identify a range of 
distinctive methodological features in foresight studies, such as time, descriptions of 
difference, participation and values, and examine these from a social constructionist 
perspective. It appears that social constructionism is highly resonant with the way in 
which knowledge of the future is produced and used.  A social constructionism 
perspective enables a methodological reflection on how, with what legitimacy, and to 
what social good, knowledge is produced.  Foresight that produces symbols without 
inter-subjective meaning neither anticipates, nor produces futures.  Our conclusion is 
that foresight is both a social construction, and a mechanism for social construction.  
Methodologically, foresight projects should acknowledge the socially constructed 
nature of their process and outcomes as this will lead to greater rigour and legitimacy.  
 
Introduction 
In this article we consider the contribution that social constructionism makes to 
foresight methodologies.  We take the term ‘methodology’ to mean ‘methods of 
knowing’, i.e. an explanation of ‘how we know’ something.  As Andrew Sayer says, a 
methodology needs to be appropriate to the nature of the object under study and the 
purpose and expectation of the study.  Methodologies are puzzle solving devices and 
require us to make assumptions of what the world is and what stands for knowledge.  
[35, p92].  There are many puzzles about the future that we would wish to solve.  
However, our focus here is on the general features of approaches to understanding and 
making sense of futures, i.e. knowledge–creating activities that are associated with the 
term foresight.  Our focus is not on how the future is produced, but the grounds we 
have to make claims about knowledge relating to the future. 
 
A common feature of the way that knowledge about futures is created is the centrality 
of symbols.  Meaning, actions, decisions, investments, conflicts and accords rest on 
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the interpretations of futures projected and communicated through symbols: words, 
texts, images, objects and symbolic actions.  Symbols such as trend lines, images, 
models, equations and of course the ubiquitous scenario are the stock-in-trade of 
foresight activities. Any foresight methodology, i.e. any attempt to validate the design 
of knowledge creation, should reflect the way that meaning emerges as thoughts and 
ideas, discourses and texts, anticipations and decisions, about the future.   
 
The article is not about the symbols and symbolism per se, these are taken for granted.  
Primarily it is about theories of the ways in which meaning is created, understood and 
acted upon.  Its purpose is to help understand and validate processes of doing 
foresight, i.e. the processes of generating and negotiating meaning and selecting 
symbols that accompany meaning.  Such meaning and the related constructed symbols 
constitute collective (social) knowing of the future and are thus inherent in foresight 
methodology; i.e. in our “method of knowing”. 
 
We draw on a body of social theory concerned with the way that meaning is produced 
and assimilated by society; specifically, the social construction of knowledge.  We 
investigate the power and the limitation that this epistemological position provides for 
‘methods of knowing’ about the future.  We start with an explanation of the theory, 
distinguishing it from its near-neighbour constructivism.  We then consider a few 
well-known contributions for foresight and futures studies from a social 
constructionism perspective.  We show that in some cases, it is an explicit feature, but 
in most cases it is, in our view, apparent but implicit. 
 
We then turn to foresight methodology specifically.  We identify a range of general 
methodological features of foresight work, without the necessity to adhere to any 
particular episteme or methodology.  This allows us the freedom to investigate the 
nature of these features when considered from a social constructionist perspective.  
We do not claim the list of features as being comprehensive, nor is that necessary.  In 
passing we note the features appear to have resonance with some of the 
methodological issues and concerns expressed by foresight practitioners.  Finally we 
reflect on the significance of a social constructionist perspective towards foresight 
methodologies and ask what are the foundations that foresight is built upon.  Our 
conclusion is that foresight is both a social construction, and a mechanism for social 
construction.  Methodologically foresight projects should acknowledge the socially 
constructed nature of the process and outcomes as this will lead to greater rigour and 
legitimacy.  
Social construction 
The central idea of social construction is that whenever we employ words or other 
symbols to refer to objects in our social world, we are constructing them, quite 
literally, as meaningful social objects that we can take account of in our actions [12, p. 
54].  There are several forms of constructivism/constructionism and the “common 
thread between all forms of constructivism is that they do not focus on an ontological 
reality, but instead on the constructed reality.” [43]. 
 
Constructivism is part of wider framework of symbolic interaction theory [5,17,30], 
which is related to the sociology of action. Symbolic interactionism is the theory that 
explanations of order and change come from the observations of everyday life and the 
interactions between people, rather than from large scale social forces and natural 
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laws (Cf. structural functionalism).  The approach aimed to uncover processes of 
communication and interaction that allowed people to make sense of their social 
world and for them to create or construct the structures that structural functionalists 
treated simply as social facts [12, p57].  Mead argued that individuals give meaning to 
the world by defining and interpreting it in certain ways [12, p53].  The premise is 
that the world is never experienced directly, but through the ideas that we hold about 
it, and that these are communicated through symbols.  Such symbols are not 
representative of reality in the sense of direct correspondence; their meaning 
constitutes interpreted reality.  As Mead [30, p78] wrote “Symbolization constitutes 
objects not constituted before, objects which would not exist except for the context of 
social relationships wherein symbolization occurs”. 
 
The concept of construction in the sociology of knowledge was introduced by Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), following Mead, Schutz’s sociology of 
understanding, Garfinkel´s ethnomethodology, Durkheims’s theory of society, 
Marxian dialectics, and Weber’s constitution of social reality through subjective 
meaning.  In “The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge” they explored how, rather than having a predisposed nature, humans 
construct their social world. They argue that any action people undertake is shaped by 
the different types of knowledge; not only scientific knowledge but cultural and 
experiential knowledge including “common sense” and the knowledge people use in 
there everyday activities (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).  Their thesis is that “reality” 
and “knowledge” pertain to specific social contexts, and relations between them have 
to be included in any analysis of the social phenomena (ibid, p15).  It helps us to 
understand that we actively make and remake social structures and institutions during 
the course of our everyday activities.  Thus knowledge, action and reality, in a 
pragmatic sense, are not separate from each other and, they claim, can be combined in 
a comprehensive theory of social action. (p207).  Starting out from two non-
contradictory statements, “consider social facts as things” [11, p 14]and “both for 
sociology in the present sense and for history, the object of cognition is the subjective 
meaning-complex of action” [42, p101], Berger and Luckmann’s investigation into 
“the manner in which reality is constructed” (ibid p.30), marks an important 
contribution to the sociology of knowledge, which we argue, is crucial in 
understanding methodological debate in relation to foresight.  
 
There is a range of perspectives and related methodologies that take a constructivist 
position, a full description of which are outside the scope of this paper.  At a broad 
level, the terms constructivism and constructionism are often used interchangeably.  
The term constructivism tends to be used when referring to epistemology.  
Constructivism tends also to be used in relation to individual (psychological) 
‘constructions of reality’, whereas social constructionism asserts that meaning and 
understandings that emerge from the interactions between people, i.e. neither 
objectively nor subjectively, but inter-subjectively.  A hybrid, ‘social constructivism’, 
suggests that the individual constructs his or her world in the head, but with categories 
supplied by social relationships [14, p 237]  Piaget’s constructivist theory, e.g. [31,41] 
is concerned with how learning happens (accommodation and assimilation) and views 
knowledge as an active construction of the knowing subject, triggered by the 
cognitive system's need for order and stability.  
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An extreme position that reality is ‘constructed’ is in some cases polarised with 
notions of essentialism or realism.  The essentialist episteme is that forms exist 
independent of human interpretation or thought and that all things, including human 
nature, have essential trans-historical characteristics.  Radical constructivists e.g von 
Glasersfeld [15] take the position that since all knowledge is socially constructed it is 
impossible to know the extent to which knowledge reflects an ontological reality.  
This does not deny a real world exists, but does deny the possibility that our 
knowledge of it can be claimed to correspond to it, because human capacity to know it 
is limited to sensed interpretation.  
 
However, there are many positions between the two polarised theories; they are not 
always mutually exclusive when considered in the realm of knowledge and knowing 
and in the performances or actions that result from knowing.  There are “weak” 
constructivist and “strong” constructivist positions.  Some hold that certain structural 
categories exist only because people agree that they exist (e.g. money, citizenship) 
[32, p202].  Others, such as Sayer, suggest that although ontological reality exists and 
affects our understanding, our knowledge of it is constructed and fallible.  
 
“Of course knowledge and social phenomena are socially constructed but that 
doesn’t mean external phenomena (including existing material social 
constructions) cannot influence our interpretations” [35, p91]. 
 
The constructivist epistemology and associated theories of knowledge and action are 
important for foresight.  Foresight is intended as a precursor to action and is 
concerned with the generation of knowledge about the anticipated consequences of 
different actions, including historical actions.  Its authenticity and power relies on the 
relationship between knowledge and action.   
 
We focus this article on the role of social processes in the construction of meaning 
because foresight, we argue, is a social process and its purpose is to construct 
meaning. As a proponent of social constructionism, Gergen [14, p224] argues that a 
commitment to the objective ‘real’ seals us off from other possibilities and in 
eliminating a ‘rich sea of alternatives’ by quieting alternative discourses, it limits 
possibilities of action.  Social constructionism does not deny reality, it accommodates 
the human and social power to generate meaningful reality.   
Social constructionism in the futures literature 
The very idea of ‘knowledge’ about an empirically non-existent / ‘yet to exist’ space 
implies a dialectic with the empirical real.  This could be read as ‘subjective’ 
knowledge versus ‘objective’ knowledge with a distinct sense that subjective 
knowledge is unscientific, unproven and ‘made up’, and therefore of little use and/or 
dangerous to the status quo.  Such dualities are deep in western metaphysics, and 
subject to considerable critique in the context of everyday practice. “Of all the 
oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most 
ruinous, is the one that is set up between objectivism and subjectivism.” [7, p1]  Tapio 
and Hietanen [38] demonstrate the inter-subjective nature of knowledge that is 
inherent in a variety of episteme used in futures studies.  They suggest that in most 
implicit futures ‘paradigms’ knowledge and values (separated in their account) are 
subjective or inter-subjective.  
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A search for the term ‘social constructionism’ in extant futures literature, yields little 
result, whether via online databases or in the indexes of key texts.  However, 
constructionism, at least in its weak form, seems to be implicit in much of the 
epistemological assumptions underlying futures studies.  We explore below a range of 
significant texts to illustrate this point.  Three notable contributions to the 
foresight/futures literature make explicit their methodological relationship to social 
constructionism; Bell, Slaughter and Inayatullah.   
 
Wendell Bell proposes a critical realist theory of knowledge for futures studies [3, p 
236], as a post-positivist and post-Kuhnian epistemology, and therefore more 
essentialist than relativist.  Bell claims that critical realism admits conjectural 
knowledge.  Writing on critical realism and method, Andrew Sayer [34,35] accepts 
that scientific and social knowledge is socially constructed, i.e. the processes of 
knowledge creation, acceptance or rejection are social, but this does not deny the 
existence of causal mechanisms or real external phenomena. This is a ‘weak’ 
constructionist position of epistemological relativism, but does not imply ontological 
relativism [35]. Extant knowledge, though fallible, can provide consistent and reliable 
models of the world and be shared between people. Similarly one person’s 
interpretation of knowledge does not necessarily stand in equal status to another’s.  It 
is interesting that in his chapter on epistemological foundations Bell (with Olick) 
construct notions of future realist knowledge as posits, surrogate knowledge and 
presumptively-true (or false) predictions; stating that ‘Futurists … make posits…[and] 
construct (italics added) surrogate knowledge as reliably and validly as they can” [3, p 
238], a process that seems congruent with weak constructionism.   
 
In comparison to Bell, Slaughter takes a much stronger constructionist line in his 
recent writings.  He uses the (reflexive) connection between self-identity and the 
social construction of knowledge, as a means of elaborating the power of the inner 
self in society.  This is part of the Integral Futures approach, in which Slaughter 
optimistically casts social constructionism as a force for change for the better.  He 
argues that “social construction moves debates about the currently threatened world 
and its many futures options away from the simpler and immediate arena of externals 
to the process of self-understanding, self-constitution and mediation of power and 
meaning at these formative levels” [37, p110].   
 
The approach is consistent with Inayatullah’s work (along with Slaughter and others) 
in critical futures research.  Critical social theory relies on an assumption that 
language is constitutive of reality, and that the social construction, in language and in 
everyday practices of a particular event or category, privileges certain interests.  The 
use of deconstruction to detect hidden or implicit meanings embedded in texts, and 
the interests that such meanings privilege, is an important methodology in critical 
theory.  Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is a futures oriented form of post-modern 
deconstruction concerned with “creating distance from current categories” [20, p 816] 
and problematising such socially constructed categories in order to identify what 
could or needs to change to produce alternative futures.  CLA is an analytical 
methodology informed by critical social theory.  Its links to social constructionism are 
explicit. 
 
Other foundational work in the Futures Studies literature has strong resonance with 
social constructionism.  Below we indicate how the work in Futures Studies on values 
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and vision (Masini) and on conjecture and futuribles, (de Jouvenel) reflect social 
constructionism. 
 
Values, as part of knowledge that guides human action, are clearly important.  Part of 
the intellectual and social legitimacy of foresight arises from the acceptance of human 
agency and moral responsibility, which imply an interpretative and reflexive stance 
with regard to knowledge.  Masini [26,28] does not separate values from knowledge 
in theorising about the way the future is constructed through the power of vision and 
projects.  She argues that absolute values exist at an ontological level, “mediated to 
the existential level of man in an ongoing process of internalization” (p1166).  Such a 
position implies a realist perspective with regards to values, i.e. moral realism. [4]  
However, her reference to collective mediation and her reminder that futures thinking 
is a learning process, suggests a ‘weak’ constructionist perspective with regards to 
knowledge implicit in visions.  
 
Masini continues this line of argument by her commitment to the power of vision, 
(e.g. [28]).  Visions have power to produce actions with an intention to change the 
future, which in turn need to become ‘projects’ constructed as a base for action.  Van 
de Helm elaborates the theoretical underpinning of vision elsewhere in this edition of 
Futures [40].  It could be argued that although visions are in some senses ‘personal’, 
the construction of what is desirable is more likely to be socially produced.  This 
production arises through languaging and interactions with others and through 
mimicry of desired social behaviour, whether real or imagined.  We suggest that the 
meaning of ‘desirable’ is articulated through social interaction and becomes personal 
vision, need or expectation, rather than personal desires becoming social desires.  
Thus knowledge of what is desirable is inter-subjectively socially constructed.  From 
this point it could be argued that even the extreme cases of utopian, ideological, or 
even dystopian, ideals, with their power to transform reality [25] become part of 
society’s articulated desires through the process of social construction. 
 
Two earlier formative ideas of futures include De Jouvenel’s [9] ‘conjecture’ and 
futuribles can be understood through a social constructionist perspective.  De 
Jouvenel’s conjecture is not truth and knowledge i.e. not empiricist/objective, but 
likelihood or possibility.  This perspective on futures studies is interpreted by van de 
Helm as the transparent construction of conjectures to be exposed to intellectual 
critique, and not [a] search for the probable. [39, p21].  Masini [27, p22] proposes that 
conjecture helps us to look at the future on the basis of plausibility as a mental 
construct; suggesting a strong constructivist perspective, i.e. individual ‘visions’ are 
inner models of what is desirable.  However, it might be argued when informed by 
social constructionism, that the power of conjecture is the inter-subjective meaning 
arising from the construction of the conjecture, through language, and negotiation of 
its probability.  Similarly, we would argue, that futuribles, or reasoned consequences, 
is a process of social construction – reasoning is a social, rather than a psychological 
act; reason has no performative power until communicated with others.   It is not the 
conjecture, but the way people act from the conjecture, exercising their own power 
‘from within’ [9,10], that creates futures. 
 
Finally we turn to examples of current work on strategy, technology and foresight.  In 
relation to knowledge and action, a modern practitioner Michel Godet [16] appears to 
take a constructivist position in stating that creating futures “is above all a state of 
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mind (imagination and anticipation) that leads to behaviour (hope and will)” (p8),  He 
describes as a “rebellion against determinism and chance”, i.e. implying the power of 
agency.  This is resonant of Azjen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour [2], which is 
concerned with the link between attitudes and behaviour, rather than the construction 
of knowledge.   However, Godet also espouses “thinking unconventionally and 
collectively” (p4), which is of course a description of a process leading to the social 
construction of knowledge: unconventionally i.e. non-normatively and collectively, 
i.e. socially produced.   
 
In the domain of technology, constructionism appears to be increasingly well 
established, as a report from the ‘High Level Expert Group’ of the European 
Commission Research Directorate illustrates.   
 
“The future is there to be made. It is something shaped by people through their 
purposeful acts and through the unintended consequences of their acts. As 
such, the future is not there to be ‘predicted’ but to be socially constructed.” 
[19, p17], 
 
Although this gives social constructionism an instrumental role, rather than seeing it 
as the way that people produce knowledge, it does reflect an increasing recognition 
that scientific knowledge is socially constructed[22-24].  Social constructionism has 
enabled critique of scientific empiricism, leading to a recognition that even in the 
domains of knowledge that have produced highly verifiable and ‘predictable’ 
relationships (theories), the production of knowledge is a social process. A recent 
example of this in foresight work is Selins’ doctoral research on the shaping of 
nanotechnology.  In this case, she focuses on the social constructions of time that are 
negotiated by heterogeneous actors who have a stake in the future of a particular class 
of technology, i.e. nanotechnology.  Selin [36, p136] concludes that temporal 
materialities of nanotechnology will “continue to be reconfigured, renegotiated, 
recoded, and hence re-temporalized”, by the actors engaged in producing its futures. 
 
Foresight methodology from a social constructionist 
perspective 
 
If we are able to detect social constructionism in extant methodologies relating to 
foresight or futures studies, is it possible to synthesise this critical analysis into a more 
normative perspective?  In the everyday practices of undertaking futures-oriented 
studies, how should a constructionist perspective shape methodology?  In order to 
address this question, we give examples of methodological characteristics that are 
consistent with investigating futures (whether called futures studies, foresight or 
forecasting).  We are not suggesting that all foresight or futures studies methodologies 
contain all of these characteristics, but we suggest that when taken together they 
create a distinctive methodological characterisation.  We recognise that this particular 
classification is constructed and open to debate and that many methodological issues 
are subsumed in this classification.  Thus we are able to analyse and discuss ways in 
which a social constructionist perspective relates to the distinctive methodological 
features.   
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The approach is not intended to atomise a methodology into discrete acts, but rather to 
give a sense to the overall implications of taking this particular perspective.  It is 
noticeable that much of what is discussed is already known or assumed implicitly and 
practiced ad hoc.  However, there are also many challenges arising from this analysis 
for what constitutes rigorous foresight practice.   
 
Time (past/present/future). A pre-requisite for futures work is one or more 
conceptions of future time.    
 
Following the work of Barbara Adam [1], it is clear that time has many meanings 
beyond ‘clock time’. Adam argues that the meaning of time is socially constructed 
and that such meaning is performative.  Futurists are of course used to dealing with 
short, medium and long-term perspectives, but it has been shown [36] that differences 
in the construction of time play a significant role in the construction of meaning about 
the future (e.g. of nanotechnologies).  The generic methodological requirement from 
this perspective is an explicit account of the construction of time within the context of 
the study at hand. 
 
Descriptive difference:  Futures work is concerned largely with changes or 
differences from the status quo or present.  Thus a methodological characteristic of 
the work is description of change, i.e. real or imagined changes in ontology..  
Abstraction from whole worlds and re-categorising of concepts or events are 
fundamental to producing descriptions of different futures.  Such descriptions may be 
produced by individuals or by groups.  They can be articulated in many forms, from 
an almost unconscious sensing that might accompany personal visioning processes, to 
a highly explicit representation as story, scenario, movie or cultural dogma. 
 
From a social constructionist perspective the processes of abstraction and 
classification are not dealing with the real, but with constructions of the real.  In 
particular, social constructionism offers legitimacy for the generation of new 
conceptual forms of meaning that resonate with empirical observation and/or social 
discourses.  That such conceptions may be challenged with regards to their power 
relative to alternatives is a legitimate part of the process of knowledge development. 
 
Representation: it is typical of futures work to produce symbolic texts as 
representations of generated knowledge about futures, often in the form of scenarios 
and stories, with illustrations. 
 
Strong social constructionism rejects the idea of correspondence between 
representation and the real.  It builds on Saussure’s position that the relationship 
between the linguistic signifier and the object signified is ultimately arbitrary, and 
thus meaning, as Gergen points out, relies on ‘local conventions’ [14, p25]. If all 
knowledge is socially constructed then it is not possible to prove correspondence with 
the real.  What is important is not correspondence but the adequacy of the concept or 
theory relative to observed world to provide explanation and a predictive capability, if 
conditional. A weak constructionist perspective, e.g. such as can be found in some 
forms of critical realism, would argue that although it can never be proven whether 
representations succeed in exact correspondence, it is possible to move towards 
correspondence of the real.  
 
 9
Methodologically, the implication of this perspective is that any implicit or explicit 
claims that texts and symbols about the future represent or correspond to the future 
are false.  Instead, such representations can be understood as having performative 
potential, i.e. may change understanding and activity through the way that people 
interact with and interpret such symbols, and change expectations about the future.   
 
Production of difference.  Explaining reasons for described differences involves 
articulating theories and practice of causality, power and influence, i.e. what produces 
(or is capable of producing) the difference.  
 
Prediction is not a word espoused in foresight, though ‘anticipation’ is used to reflect 
an expectation of being able to identify difference and its production over time.  
Gergen adds a further insight in a discussion on theory and in particular prediction.  
He suggests that prediction (such as the theories underlying the engineering of a 
successful space landing) is created by a community interacting with shared 
meanings.  He says that it is a “mistake to hold that theories (as symbols independent 
of a community of actors) make predictions”… 
 
“For when the words or symbols of the theory are cut away from a community 
of users is doesn’t tell us anything. […] There are no consequences. […] 
‘Predictions’ are effectively moves in meaning, born in relationships.  The 
particular words themselves are simply partial constituents of a social practice 
we call ‘prediction’. […] The creation of a prediction and its success are 
community achievements”.   
 
This perspective is profound in the context of foresight.  It situates knowledge of the 
future as epistemically consistent with knowledge of the past and present, in that the 
future is produced by a community interacting with shared meaning.  We would 
suggest that implicit in this is the position that knowledge generated about the future 
has a potential to influence the actions of a community which is equal to that of the 
potential of knowledge of the past or present.  Whether such potential is realised 
depends on its interpretation, resonance and legitimacy by that community.   
 
It is necessary therefore to consider the ways in which knowledge is produced and 
legitimated by different communities.  Rom Harré makes the point clearly when he 
says: 
 
“Context by context the balance between constructionism and essentialism and 
between realism and relativism, and how each pair maps on to the other, will 
be decided in different ways in different contexts.”… “How can [I] be a social 
constructionist in psychology and a realist in physics?” [18, p xi-xii] 
 
Methodologically, context is important, because dynamical properties of different 
contexts operate in different ways, for instance, a political party acts differently from 
a waterfall.  Different theories and explanations, even different epistemological 
assumptions apply to different contexts, as the quotation from Harré (above) 
exemplifies.  If a social constructionist perspective is taken, then such knowledge is 
considered to be socially produced.  The production of domain knowledge is different 
in different contexts; socio-political knowledge is produced differently from 
knowledge about the flow of water.  This would suggest that in the study of the future 
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of a particular domain, the mode by which domain knowledge about the future is 
produced (i.e. socially constructed) should be explicit, though not necessarily 
reproduced.  One tension that arises if the production mode of knowledge for the 
domain is reproduced in producing knowledge relating to the future of that domain is 
that the generation of novel (paradigmic) boundaries and novel structures may be 
constrained.  An example of producing knowledge in a way that acknowledges social 
constructionism but does not replicate the mode by which it is produced is the use of 
critical theory by causal layered analysis [20], which acknowledges the hegemony 
implicit in the production of texts but also deconstructs these.   
 
Simulation: Studies of futures usually involve the generation of alternative worlds 
(from micro to macro). Examples include alternative scenarios, counter-factual 
reasoning [6], role-playing and computer based models.  
 
At face value, simulation would appear to be a constructionist, i.e. producing 
knowledge in the form of models of explicitly non-real worlds.  What can these be but 
constructions?  The answer to this depends on the methodology used.  One has to ask 
to what extent does the simulation of the production of knowledge, produce meaning?  
To what extent is it performative, i.e. produces changes in activity of people?   
 
Let us compare computer based simulation with role-playing as two methods of 
simulating the production of futures.  It is not possible for the simulation of alternative 
futures within a machine per se to produce social knowledge.  However, the social 
processes leading to the construction of the models used and the interpretation and 
dissemination of the outcomes of simulation, for instance within a research group can 
create meaning and produce socially constructed knowledge. 
 
Role play, where humans ‘act out’ particular events or situations is a social form of 
simulation.  Amongst other things, role playing is used in anticipation of real events 
(e.g. in disaster planning), in order to prepare participants for the real experiences, as 
yet unknown, that they may encounter.  This would appear to reproduce socially 
constructed knowledge which, because of the falseness of the situation does not 
correspond with experiences that will be encountered, but does enable participants, 
and observers to anticipate what such and event may be like in a real and therefore 
more uncontrolled environment. 
 
In both of these examples, knowledge is generated, first by modelling possible 
structures and then by playing out and interpreting what is generated dynamically, i.e. 
a simulation of events through time, generating (new) meaning from the known 
through social interaction.   
 
From a social constructionist perspective the model is not a representation but a 
construction that provides a degree of adequacy in explaining the nature of the 
phenomena being explored.  What is important and salient is the meaning generated 
by the community that engages with the simulation, and what performative power 
such engagement has. 
 
Communication of meaning: It is usual for the outcomes of futures work to be 
communicated to others. One could argue that foresight, as a project, cannot carry 
social meaning unless its results are communicated to or with others.  The texts, 
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stories and symbols used to communicate about the future are languaged.  Radical 
constructionists, such at Maturana and Varela [29], consider languaging to be the 
‘connection’ between the individual and the experienced world; it is through 
languaging that resonance (and hence meaning) is constructed by the individual – that 
language provides the ‘structural capacity’ to give meaning to the experienced 
environment.   
 
As social constructionism places knowledge neither within individual minds nor 
outside them, but between people, it is the acts of communication and the meaning 
negotiated in those process that constitute knowledge, not the symbols used.  One 
significant issue arising from this is the degree of responsibility taken or given to 
foresight as a separate project from its constituency.  As a separate project, i.e. acts 
that ‘inform’ policy makers or citizens, foresight cannot be responsible for the 
meaning that emerges amongst its constituency as a result of being informed.  If 
foresight is expected to produce responsible action, then the production of meaning 
must be embedded in its constituency. 
 
Reflexivity, i.e. reconstructing meaning from a process of interpreted feedback.  
Wendell Bell suggests that Futures Studies is ‘self consciously reflexive’ [3, p 237], 
i.e. the production of descriptions of alternative futures can shape and change 
everyday understanding and performance.   
 
The concept of reflexivity is consistent with a constructivism, and in particular that 
our self-identities and social identity are shaped through the interaction with others 
and the knowledge available to us. Such identities are the result of how people 
meaningfully regard their actions, and how their identities and interpretations of the 
external world are constructed and reconstructed from their continuing experiences of 
that world [13].  This provides what Maturana and Varela called ‘structural plasticity’, 
i.e. the power of individual interactions to reshape and create meaning in and of 
society.   
 
Methodologically, reflexivity is a description of the performative power of social 
discourse.  It suggests that by engaging in reflections of futures, which directly 
challenge self and community identity, people can produce change.  Whether such 
change is directed outwardly or inwardly depends on the agency and power available.  
It also suggests how the power of information can work, and furthermore that 
reflexivity is an ongoing process, producing ever-changing ontologies and discourses, 
and that any captured articulation of a view of the future is an abstraction of time and 
space. 
 
Participation.  It is common for futures activities, such as foresight programmes, to 
engage with human actors that have a stake in the future of the specified subject.   
 
A central tenet of social constructionism is that without participation between people 
in making meaning (or sense-making) no meaning exists.  From this perspective 
participation between people is necessary to generate social knowledge about the 
future.  However, ‘participation’ in this sense has a wide meaning, for instance it can 
take place through languaging and discourses.  If the results of foresight activities are 
discourses and actions about the future, then who participates in creating and 
performing in these discourses has methodological implications. 
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In this respect a significant methodological issue is perspectivism, i.e. the conception 
according to which the world is inhabited by different sorts of subjects or 
people…which apprehend reality from distinct points of view' [8, p 469].  There are, 
Gergen suggests, great dangers involved in fixing a particular version of the real and 
the good [14, p 235].  Participation by people who share a particular perspective is 
more likely to maintain particular versions of the ‘real and the good’.   
 
If the future is created by a diversity of perspectives and the performances arising 
from these, then any look-ahead to the future should, presumably, acknowledge, 
synthesise and assimilate the paths that such diversity is in the process of creating.  At 
the very least, foresight methodology should reflect explicitly the perspectives it is 
taking in ‘fixing’ the real and the good related to the future.   
 
Thus it is banal to suggest that the inclusion of ‘stakeholder groups’ in workshops is 
effecting participation.  It may, or it may not.  What is important is that the 
methodology makes explicit the dominant discourses and languages through which 
participation in the generation of knowledge actually occurs – often done outside such 
workshop activities.  Similarly the extent to which multi perspectives are somehow 
reduced to a single ‘consensus’, of a (temporary) fixed future is of methodological 
significance as is the way that this is achieved.  This is not just a political issue – 
though has political consequences – but a question of the degree to which claims to 
knowledge can be made from single perspectives. 
 
Action: Futures studies and foresight are performative in at least two ways: i) they are 
concerned with what produces different futures and ii) cognisance of expectations or 
anticipated future effects of present actions can change or motivate action. 
 
There is a strong rhetorical connection between futures work and actions.  Often the 
explicit purpose of investigating futures is to help choices to be made about what 
actions are likely to lead to desired futures.  Conceptually the radical constructivists 
Maturana and Varela suggested that “all doing is knowing and all knowing is doing”, 
and thus do not detach knowing from doing.  Methodologically, from a social 
constructionist perspective, it is the interpretation and construction of meaning from 
ongoing everyday experiences that produce knowledge and expectations about the 
future.   
 
Thus action produces futures and also knowledge about futures.  Knowledge about 
futures produces action.  Therefore, futures are produced through acts of producing 
the future in which knowledge is inherent and co-produced by the actors.  Separation 
of action from knowledge reifies one or other.  It seems therefore that producing 
knowledge about futures is part of the act of producing futures.  The extent to which 
some types of act have power lies not in the acts themselves but in their interpretation 
and meaning, i.e. in their social construction. 
 
Explicit “action research” methods are used in foresight, some tacitly [33], some 
explicitly: for example “anticipatory action learning” in which the “future is 
constructed within the terms of the subject” [21, .p658] where metaphors are “not 
seen as universal but as particular to epistemic communities”.  Such activities focus 
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strongly on the performative qualities of processes that engage communities to attain 
such visions.   
 
Values:  There is a strong normative element in foresight and futures studies, when its 
purpose is to critique present trajectories, propose better futures, or elaborate expected 
or desired futures.   
 
A significant criticism of constructionism is that it is inherently relativist, i.e. if 
knowledge does not correspond with any absolute truth then one account is equally 
valid as another.  For Gergen [14] social constructionism does not carry particular 
values and has “no position on relativism” (p231).  Social constructionism accepts 
“what is” from an observable empirical perspective, e.g. the existence of poverty, 
AIDS, CO2 levels etc.  The methodological concern is about how such knowledge is 
produced and how it is legitimised, not the legitimacy (i.e. correspondence) of the 
knowledge per se.  
 
We would suggest therefore, that adopting a social constructionist perspective in 
futures work requires a methodology that makes explicit the values that accompany 
the interpretation of meaning.  This requires an exploration of the dominant values of 
the people or organisations that produce and validate knowledge about the future.  
This is far from easy to achieve because many values are inherent in the language and 
concepts used to frame interpretation.  
 
Conclusions: the methodological implications of 
foresight as a social construction  
 
Methodological choice depends on the intention or puzzle to be ‘solved’, and in 
relation to this, the context.  There are many different aims of foresight activities 
including decision–making, learning, exploration of possibilities, articulation of 
desirable outcomes, sharing of knowledge, persuasion, encouraging action etc.  These 
aims are set in many different contexts and are concerned with phenomena that 
behave in many different ways, i.e. have particular ontologies.  The commonality is 
that foresight activities produce knowledge in relation to a future time and such 
instrumental knowledge is generated by social action, e.g. discourse, language, 
negotiation.   
 
It appears that social constructionism is highly resonant with the production of 
foresight knowledge.  Central to foresight methodologies is the way in which 
knowledge is produced and used.  Methodologically, the accuracy of the knowledge is 
less significant than the process by which the knowledge is produced.  Gergen says 
that social constructionism has no position on relativism.  However we argue that 
foresight does have a position on how the salience, accuracy and relevance of 
knowledge is accepted, rejected, modified and used by society.  What is crucial to 
foresight methodology is an explicit reflection on how, with what legitimacy, and to 
what social good, knowledge is produced.  These issues can be addressed 
methodologically through the perspective of social constructionism. 
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This is not to say that the content of knowledge about the future is irrelevant, but quite 
the opposite.  Relativism can be extremely dangerous in the creation of futures.  An 
understanding of social constructionism is essential for the moral and physical futures 
of humanity.  (Socially constructed) knowledge is fallible, partial, privileged and 
contestable.  The process of social constructionism produces new knowledge, not as a 
matter of empirical discovery, but as a process of creation.   
 
Knowledge as a creative social process is a powerful explanation for the 
unpredictability of futures.  The future is built on the creation of knowledge and on 
the way this knowledge guides everyday choices.  Work associated with anticipating 
the unpredictable is constitutive of the future. What is taken as knowledge about the 
future becomes empirical. The powers that are enacted by and through such 
knowledge are real.  It is essential that such work is methodologically robust. 
 
The analysis in this paper has indicated some of the ways in which social 
constructionism guides the focus for designing robust foresight methodologies.  At an 
overarching level is the central concept that knowledge, meaning and subsequent 
actions are produced through the interactions between people.  In relation to some of 
the specific characteristics of foresight methodology, this perspective requires that 
claims to knowledge should take an explicit account of the: 
 
• Construction of time within the context of the study at hand. 
• Power manifest in representational choice  
• Performative power of symbolic representations  
• Mode by which domain knowledge is produced  
• Meaning generated by the community that engages, and what performative 
power such engagement has 
• Degree to which the production of meaning must be embedded in its 
constituency, in relation to the responsibility taken for subsequent actions  
• Performative power of social discourse and challenges to self and community 
identity 
• Dominant discourses and languages through which participation in the 
generation of knowledge actually occurs  
• Interaction between knowledge and action 
• Values that accompany the interpretation of meaning 
 
Foresight is both a social construction and a mechanism for social construction.  
Foresight, as a concept and as practice, is a social construction; there are many 
examples of how society accepts the value and necessity of anticipating and 
contemplating futures (e.g. risk assessment, planning, storage and tool-making), so 
these activities are done.  These acts, often institutional, and which are part of 
everyday life and constitute preparation for the future, are socially constructed.  
Foresight as a process of contemplating futures is a mechanism for the social 
construction of knowledge.  In the process of enacting foresight programmes and 
processes, people construct knowledge.  Thus most significantly for this article, 
foresight methodology, the processes and perspective that provide an explanation of 
‘how we know’ something, is a mechanism for the social construction of knowledge. 
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The above analysis has demonstrated that far from being a ‘new idea’ social 
constructionism has been implicit in the foundations of modern (and post-modern) 
futures studies.  We have shown that this is implicit in the way that more overtly 
constructivist accounts (visions, hopes and fears, imagination etc) have been assumed 
to somehow form collective meaning and action and implicit also in the confluence of 
epistemological and ontological relativism.  However, because a constructionist 
perspective has been implicit, the well grounded foundations of futures studies are 
open to less than rigorous interpretation.  We started this article by considering the 
place of symbols in the articulation of futures.  It is easy to produce symbols of 
possible futures and in doing so make claims to knowledge about the future.  
Foresight methodologies that produce symbols without regard to inter-subjective 
meaning neither anticipate, nor produce futures.  
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